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Abstract
The demand for the secondary use of medical data is in-
creasing steadily to allow for the provision of better quality
health care. Two important issues pertaining to this sharing
of data have to be addressed: one is the privacy protection
for individuals referred to in the data; the other is copyright
protection over the data. In this paper, we present a uniﬁed
framework that seamlessly combines techniques of binning
and digital watermarking to attain the dual goals of privacy
and copyright protection. Our binning method is built upon
anearlierapproachofgeneralizationandsuppressionbyal-
lowing a broader concept of generalization. To ensure data
usefulness, we propose constraining Binning by usage met-
rics that deﬁne maximal allowable information loss, and the
metrics can be enforced off-line. Our watermarking algo-
rithm watermarks the binned data in a hierarchical manner
by leveraging on the very nature of the data. The method
is resilient to the generalization attack that is speciﬁc to the
binned data, as well as other attacks intended to destroy the
inserted mark. We prove that watermarking could not ad-
versely interfere with binning, and implemented the frame-
work. Experiments were conducted, and the results show the
robustness of the proposed framework.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, effective sharing of medical data is essential
to foster the collaboration within the health care commu-
nity and with other parties such as research institutes, phar-
maceutical and insurance companies, so as to enhance the
quality and efﬁcacy of health care provision. For example,
a hospital may need to outsource clinical records in its au-
tonomous databases to a research institute in an attempt to
discover a new drug or evaluate a new therapy. Such need
is clearly shown by research trends in the area of health care
management and procedures that are increasingly based on
extensive analysis of medical data. The dissemination of
medical data could also be to satisfy legal requirements. As
reported by the National Association of Health Data Organi-
zation in 1996, 37 states in the United States had legislative
mandates to gather personal health information from hospi-
tals for cost-analysis purposes [22].
The direct release of medical data invariably violates in-
dividual privacy. Data must be thus properly processed be-
foredeliveryinorder toprotectthe privacyoftheindividuals
they refer to. A straightforward method for achieving in-
dividual privacy is to de-identify (anonymize) the data, by
replacing any explicit identifying information (e.g., name
and social security number) by some randomized values.
This alone, however, does not sufﬁce to guarantee the full
anonymity of medical data as pointed out by numerous stud-
ies (see for example, [13, 28, 26, 29]). An example of-
ten outlined is re-identiﬁcation by linking attributes such as
birth date, zip code that are shared by the anonymized med-
ical data and some externally collected voting records. This
has motivated many more advanced approaches in the litera-
ture (see Section 2). Of particular interest is the approach of
generalization and suppression [26, 28, 29] that represents
values by corresponding more general but semantically ac-
cordant alternatives.
The sharing of medical data also exposes data holders
to the threat of data theft. Related to this, yet another im-
portant protection requirement regarding outsourced medi-
cal data arises, that is, how to protect data ownership (copy-
right). It is quite obvious that medical data are an important
asset to the data holders who have collected and compiled
the information. Incentives to unauthorized data distribu-
tion arise from an increasingly thriving data industry where
ﬁrms such as biotech companies collect, compile, share or
sell (bio)medical data for proﬁts. Even though there are
laws concerning copyright and ownership rights, we need
effective mechanisms to establish and protect the holders’
rightful possession of the data. Consequently and naturally,
digital watermarking techniques, initially proposed for the
protection of multimedia content [6, 15], have been recently
also applied to relational data. As such, digital watermark-￿￿￿￿
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Figure 1. A domain hierarchy tree (DHT) for a column representing the types of person roles
ing techniques represent a viable solution for the problem of
enforcing ownership of medical data. However, a main dif-
ference of medical data with respect to data from different
domains is represented by the need of also assuring privacy.
It is thus clear that when dealing with outsourced medical
data, both individual privacy and data ownership must be
protected. To meet these dual needs, we propose a frame-
work that integrates techniques of binning and digital water-
marking, such that the medical data to be outsourced would
undergotwoconsecutivestepsofbinningandwatermarking,
respectively. The main contributions of our work include:
1. A uniﬁed framework that seamlessly combines binning
and digital watermarking for the protection of both individ-
ualprivacyanddataownership. Wegiveboththeoreticaland
experimental analysis on the “seamless-ness” of the combi-
nation.
2. A binning algorithm that enforces the functionality of
“binning”. The method bins downward, and extends an ear-
lier approach of generalization and suppression by allowing
a broader concept of generalization.
3. A hierarchical watermarking scheme that is resilient to
various attacks attempting to remove the embedded mark,
and especially robust against the newly discovered general-
ization attack. In addition, we propose an elegant solution to
the rightful ownership problem concerning watermarking.
4. The adoption of usage metrics for preserving data qual-
ity with respect to the intended usage. We deﬁne our usage
metrics by modeling information loss, and propose an off-
line enforcement of the usage metrics.
5. Experimental studies of the proposed framework.
Compared to existing approaches, a main innovative as-
pect of our work is represented by a downward binning pro-
cess for the satisfaction of k-anonymity speciﬁcation, due to
the off-line enforcement of usage metrics; our watermark-
ing algorithm is a novel hierarchical scheme that exploits
the very nature of the underlying data, which also provides
a neat solution to the rightful ownership problem.
Organization: We review related work in Section 2. In Sec-
tion 3, we give an overview of our framework. We then
proceed to detail our binning algorithm and watermarking
algorithm in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6,
we present a theoretical analysis on the seamlessness of our
framework. Section 7 provides experimental results and
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Background and Related Work
Two classes of techniques closely related to our work are
information disclosure control and relational database wa-
termarking, and we shall review them in this section. Given
a relational table containing medical data, columns can be
categorized into three types based on the identifying infor-
mation each contains. Columns that explicitly identify in-
dividuals (e.g., social security number) are known as identi-
fying columns, and columns containing potentially identify-
ing information that could be linked with other data sets to
re-identify individuals are called quasi-identifying columns.
Typical examples of quasi-identifying columns include zip
code, birth date, etc. The other columns contain no iden-
tifying information. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to
quasi-identifyingcolumnsunlessexplicitlystatedotherwise.
Information Disclosure Control
Information disclosure arises when either the identity of an
individual is directly revealed or something about an indi-
vidual can be derived from the released data. By conven-
tion, we call the former identity disclosure and the latter
attribute disclosure [18]. We only discuss the identity dis-
closure problem in this work, and refer interested readers to
[31] for in-depth discussions on the attribute disclosure.
One well known approach to identity disclosure con-
trol is to transform quasi-identifying columns to entertain
k-anonymity constraint (k is a constant), i.e., data are gen-
eralized and suppressed in such a way that every record
is indistinguishable from at least k-1 other records, so that
no search can be narrowed down to a particular individual
[13, 26, 28, 29]. The satisfaction to k-anonymity can also be
understood as: records containing the same value constitute
a bin, and the size of every bin is at least equal to k. By deﬁ-
nition, generalization involves replacing a value with a more
general but semantically accordant value, while suppression
deals with preventing data releases. Generalization of cate-
gorical attributes is based on the fact that the representation
of medical data can be normally arranged into a domain hi-
erarchy tree (DHT), where the most general description of
the data is at the root of the tree while the leaves denote
the most speciﬁc descriptions. Figure 1 shows a DHT on
the type of roles: leaf nodes represent all possible particular￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Figure 2. Protection framework for outsourced medical data
roles a column may assume, and generality of the descrip-
tion increases with the level along the tree, until the root
node distinguishing no speciﬁcity. A generalization works
by replacing the values represented by the leaf nodes by
their corresponding ancestor nodes at a higher level. A valid
generalization in [26, 28, 29] requires all its generalization
nodes be at the same level in the domain hierarchy tree.
Clearly, generalization and suppression result in a loss
of speciﬁcity, thereby making the re-identiﬁcation process
harder. However, the tradeoff between the level of pri-
vacy and the amount of information loss must be carefully
evaluated, as too much generalization could possibly render
the data useless while slight generalization could not pro-
vide adequate protection. [14] suggested associating usage
based metrics with the process of meeting k-anonymity. Our
framework incorporates the same idea of usage metrics, but
we deﬁne a different set of metrics, and suggest off-line en-
forcement of the metrics. Metrics in [14] are deﬁned in ac-
cordance with the broader notion of generalization allowed
therein, which does not require all generalization nodes stay
at the same level. The binning method in [19] follows a sim-
ilar broader deﬁnition of generalization. Considering the
ﬂexibility and ﬁner granularity it offers, our binning algo-
rithm also includes such a broader notion in extending the
generalization and suppression in [26, 28, 29]. Moreover,
the off-line enforcement of usage metrics essentially enables
a downward binning in our context.
Another approach to the identity disclosure problem is to
perturb the data by adding noise or swapping values, while
at the same time maintaining some statistical properties of
the entire data set [17, 11]. It is again vital to determine
the right tradeoff between information loss and privacy –
a topic which is now under active research [8, 32]. Other
approaches dealing with data privacy and conﬁdentiality but
addressing issues different from ours include [12, 30, 1, 3,
21, 4, 5].
Watermarking of Relational Data
Digital watermarking has long been investigated for copy-
right protection, mainly over multimedia content, e.g., im-
ages and video clips [6, 15]. There have been recent efforts
in watermarking relational databases. Due to the very nature
of relational data, watermarking techniques for databases
turned out not to be a direct deployment of techniques for
multimedia data. A seminal approach to watermarking rela-
tionaldataispresentedin[2]. However, theuseofLeastSig-
niﬁcant Bits (LSB) embedding in the scheme makes it inher-
ently vulnerable, as a simple ﬂipping of LSBs would com-
pletely destroy the inserted mark. [24] proposed a method
for watermarking numbers that is robust because the mark
embedding relies on data distribution rather than on trivial
LSB modiﬁcation. The idea has later been integrated in a
framework for watermarking numeric attributes of relational
databases [25]. A theoretical investigation on watermarking
techniques for databases and XML documents is presented
in [7], which attempts to achieve watermarking while pre-
serving a set of parametric queries in a speciﬁed language.
Another approach [23] was recently proposed dealing
with watermarking categorical attributes in databases. In
essence, the data to be watermarked in our context become
categorical after binning, so our watermarking also reduces
to handling categorical data. Unfortunately, such approach
cannot be directly applied to our case because it is suscepti-
ble to a kind of generalization attack (see Section 5).
3 Overview of Our Framework
To simultaneously attain the goals of protecting individ-
ual privacy and copyright protection regarding outsourced
medical data, we combine techniques of binning and digital
watermarking into a uniﬁed framework. As shown in Fig-
ure 2, the framework comprises two key components, i.e.,
binning agent and watermarking agent, dedicated to binning
and watermarking, respectively. In the framework, the med-
ical data to be outsourced would undergo two consecutive
steps of transformation. Speciﬁcally, the binning agent ﬁrst
bins the data to satisfy k-anonymity speciﬁcation. After-
wards, the binned data are watermarked by the watermark-
ing agent by inserting within the data a mark, which, upon
extraction, asserts provable ownership. The data resulting
from these transformations are then expected to adequately
protect both privacy and copyright, thereby qualiﬁed for out-
sourcing. Both binning and watermarking are governed by
usage metrics in order to preserve data usability. Next, we
shall discuss some speciﬁc aspects of the framework.
Usage Metrics: Usage metrics deﬁne a set of maximal dis-
tortions that binning and watermarking are allowed to intro-
duce with respect to the intended data usage (see Section 4).Transformation exceeding the bounds is assumed to render
the data useless.
k-anonymity Speciﬁcation: k-anonymity speciﬁcation in-
cludes the system parameter k, and possibly also the set of
quasi-identifying columns to be binned and other relevant
constraints pertaining to binning.
Binning Agent: Driven by the binning algorithm, the bin-
ning agent attempts to bin the data to satisfy k-anonymity
speciﬁcation while at the same time adhering to the usage
metrics. After binning, each bin is guaranteed to contain at
least k records, so no speciﬁc individual can be identiﬁed.
The binning algorithm takes as input the original data, the
k-anonymity speciﬁcation, the domain hierarchy trees for
each quasi-identifying attribute, and the usage metrics. We
suggest a preprocessing step to create the domain hierarchy
trees and determine the system parameters.
Watermarking Agent: The watermarking agent continues to
process the binned data by embedding an owner-speciﬁc
mark. The underlying watermarking algorithm exploits a
secret watermarking key (may contain several elements),
known only to the data owner, to manipulate the process
of mark embedding. Without having possession of the se-
cret watermarking key, no one can erase the inserted mark
from the data. Watermarking also observes usage metrics,
ensuring that it does not corrupt the data in terms of the an-
ticipated usage; the domain hierarchy trees are needed as
well for inspection by our watermarking algorithm.
4 Binning Algorithm
Our binning algorithm extends the approach of general-
ization and suppression in [26, 28, 29] by allowing a broader
notionofgeneralizationasin[14], whichdoesnotrequireall
generalization nodes of a generalization to be necessarily at
the same level of the domain hierarchy tree. In particular, a
valid generalization is represented by a set of generalization
nodes in the domain hierarchy tree that satisfy the follow-
ing condition: The path from every leaf to the root along the
tree encounters one (to guarantee generalizability) and only
one (to guarantee deterministic generalization) generaliza-
tion node. This deﬁnition includes the case of a leaf node
itself being a generalization node. We have seen domain of
a categorical attribute being organized into a domain hierar-
chy tree; we next describe the generalization of a numeric
column. It is accomplished by ﬁrst dividing the domain
space of the column into a series of disjoint intervals, and
then pairwise combining them into a binary tree. With the
tree, generalization proceeds in the same way as for a cate-
gorical attribute. As an example, Figure 3 depicts the con-
struction of a binary domain hierarchy tree for the column
Age with domain [0, 150). In order to avoid over-binning
the data, intervals should be of moderate size (smaller) and
they need not to be of equal size.
Clearly, binning makes data less speciﬁc (more general),
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Figure 3. Constructing binary DHT for a nu-
meric attribute
thereby resulting in some information loss. It would make
no sense to meet k-anonymity speciﬁcation if that renders
the data useless, thus data quality must be preserved. We
suggest constraining the binning process to abide by usage
metrics specifying a set of maximal allowable information
loss. More information loss than as speciﬁed would substan-
tially degrade the data quality with respect to the intended
data usage.
4.1 Usage Metrics
Consider ﬁrst a categorical column c that associates with
a domain a hierarchy tree T, e.g., Figure 1. If Pharmacist
is generalized to Paramedic, under our deﬁnition of general-
ization, child nodes of Paramedic would become indiscrim-
inatable. This in turn implies that all entries in c containing
Pharmacist/Nurse/Consultant would become indiscriminat-
able. This concept of indiscrimination leads to our approach
for quantifying information loss InfLossc for the column c
as follows. Suppose a generalization results in a set of gen-
eralization nodes fp1, p2, ..., pMg; let Si be a set containing
the leaf nodesof the subtree that is rooted at pi, and the num-
ber of entries in c containing values in Si be ni, i = 1::M.
Information loss InfLossc is deﬁned as
InfLossc =
PM
i=1(ni
jSij¡1
jSj )
PM
i=1 ni
(1)
where S = S1
S
S2
S
:::
S
SM is the set of leaf nodes of
the tree T. We allow some leaf nodes to remain ungeneral-
ized given that k-anonymity speciﬁcation is already met, in
which case jSij = 1.
We next consider a numeric attribute c, e.g., Age. Sup-
pose the domain of c, whose lower and upper bounds are
L and U, respectively, is generalized into M intervals. The
lower and the upper bounds for these intervals are Li and
Ui, respectively, i = 1::M. Let ni be the number of en-
tries in the column c whose values fall between Li and Ui,
InfLossc is then deﬁned as
InfLossc =
PM
i=1(ni
Ui¡Li
U¡L )
PM
i=1 ni
(2)Once all InfLossi, i = 1::CN (CN is the total number
of the generalized columns) are determined, a normalized
loss InfLoss is computed by averaging over all generalized
columns in the table:
InfLoss =
PCN
i=1 InfLossi
CN
(3)
Likewise, other forms of information loss, e.g., total in-
formation loss can be deﬁned. In general, the usage metrics
for controlling information loss are deﬁned as following:
InfLossi · bdi 8i = 1;:::;CN (4)
InfLoss · bdavg
where B = fbd1;:::;bdCNg ½ R and bdavg 2 R deﬁne the
bounds for maximal allowable information loss.
In practice, the enforcement of the above metrics in a nor-
mal way might not be ideal as it involves calculating infor-
mation loss and in turn checking against the bounds after
every step of binning. Fortunately, we can implement an
off-line enforcement, yielding a set of maximal generaliza-
tion nodes in each domain hierarchy tree. Maximal gener-
alization nodes are deﬁned as 1) constituting a valid gen-
eralization; 2) each being the highest node in the domain
hierarchy tree to which the corresponding leaf nodes can be
generalized under the usage metrics. Usage metrics in the
form of maximal generalization nodes are obviously much
easier to enforce, only requiring that none of the leaf nodes
be generalized beyond its corresponding maximal general-
ization node. It is preferable that the maximal generalization
nodes are directly given as the usage metrics, rather than be-
ing transformed from the form of Equation (4).
We note that a generalization comprising the maximal
generalization nodes trivially satisﬁes k-anonymity speciﬁ-
cation given that the data are binnable. The point is to meet
k-anonymity while minimizing information loss. It is thus
clear that binning would yield a set of generalization nodes
that are lower than or at most equal to the maximal general-
ization nodes. This reasonably reﬂects the underlying prin-
ciple that binning is not allowed to damage data usage. Let
us consider the earlier example of generalizing a numeric
attribute, where we suppose the set of intervals in satisfying
k-anonymity is depicted by the leaf nodes of the tree in Fig-
ure 4: enforcement of the usage metrics might most likely
allows for further generalizations, yielding the set of maxi-
mal generalization nodes denoted as elliptic nodes.
4.2 Binning
We decompose binning into two steps, i.e., mono-
attribute binning and multi-attribute binning. The mono-
attribute binning step bins attributes individually so that
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Figure 4. A DHT by enforcing usage metrics
each transformed attribute satisﬁes k-anonymity. The multi-
attribute binning step is required because, while each at-
tributesatisﬁesk-anonymity, combinationsofthemmaynot.
Consider an example of a transformed table, where 36 peo-
ple have an age between 25 » 50 and 8 people are doctors,
each satisfying k-anonymity speciﬁcation with k = 6. How-
ever, there might be only 4 people who are aged between
25 » 50 who are also doctors.
For ease of referencing, we list in Table 1 the variables
and functions that will be used in this and the next section.
Notation Meaning
tr the domain hierarchy tree for an attribute
tbl the table to be protected
mingends the set of minimal generalization nodes
maxgends the set of maximal generalization nodes
ultigends the set of ultimate generalization nodes
k the system parameter for k-anonymity
k1, k2, ´ elements of the secret watermarking key
wm, wmd actual and replicated mark, respectively
Parent(nd, tr) returns the parent node of nd in tr
Children(nd, tr) returns the set of child nodes of nd in tr
Siblings(nd, tr) returns nd together with its sibling nodes in tr
Leaves(tr) returns the set of leaf nodes of tr
SubTree(nd, tr) returns the subtree of tr rooted at nd
Duplicate(wm) duplicates wm to produce wmd
Val2Nd(v, nds[]) returns the node in nds[] that represents v
Nd2Val(nd) returns the value represented by nd
Set¹Bit(v, b) sets the least signiﬁcant bit of v to be the bit b
Index(nd, S) returns the index of nd in the set S
MajorVot(wmd) majority voting over wmd
Table 1. Variables and Functions
4.2.1 Mono-attribute Binning
For an individual attribute, our binning starts from the max-
imal generalization nodes downwards along the domain hi-
erarchy tree, until reaching a set of lowest nodes that consti-
tute a valid generalization catering to k-anonymity speciﬁ-
cation. We term such nodes minimal generalization nodes.
Ourwayofdownwardbinningisanadvantageofferedbythe
off-line enforcement of usage metrics. The mono-attribute
binning is basically an exhaustive trial procedure in a search
for the set of minimal generalization nodes. For this rea-
son, downward binning may have efﬁciency advantage overprevious work that bins upward along the tree (e.g., [19]).
Note that the observance of usage metrics is directly accom-
plished by starting binning from the maximal generalization
nodes. Figure 5 outlines the algorithm for generating the set
of minimal generalization nodes.
GenMinNd(tr, maxgends, tbl, k)
1. mingends Ã NULL
2. foreach node nd 2 maxgends
3. subtr Ã SubTree(nd, tr)
4. mingends Ã mingends
S
SubGMN(subtr, tbl, k)
SubGMN(tree str, tbl, k)
1. if NumTuple(str, tbl) < k
2. return NULL
3. forany node nd 2 Children(str.root, tr)
4. if NumTuple(SubTree(nd, str), tbl) < k
5. return fstr.rootg
6. tmpset Ã NULL
7. foreach nd 2Children(str.root, str)
8. subtr Ã SubTree(nd, str)
9. tmpset Ã tmpset
S
SubGMN(subtr, tbl, k)
10. return tmpset
NumTuple(tree str, tbl)
1. int num = 0
2. foreach tuple ti 2 tbl
3. if ti.val 2 Leaves(str)
4. num Ã num + 1
5. return num
Figure 5. Mono-attribute binning algorithm
We employ a simple rationale in generating a minimal
generalization node: a node is minimal if itself meets k-
anonymity, but not all of its child nodes do. This might lead
to an over-generalization of the data. A more aggressive
strategy could be capitalized on, e.g., a node is not minimal
if any of its child nodes satisﬁes k-anonymity.
4.2.2 Multi-attribute Binning
Multi-attribute binning involves further binning attributes,
each of which already satisﬁes k-anonymity. However, for
an individual attribute, the set of allowable generalizations
for the purpose of multi-attribute binning is already deﬁned
by the nodes between the minimal generalization nodes and
the maximal generalization nodes. Consider Figure 6: the
set of allowable generalizations constrained by the minimal
generalization nodes and the maximal generalization nodes
are enumerated as f30, 31, 45, 46, 33, 22g, f30, 31, 32, 33,
22g, f30, 31, 21, 22g, f20, 45, 46, 33, 22g, f20, 32, 33, 22g
and f20, 21, 22g. As a result, the set of allowable general-
izations for the entire table is the enumeration of different
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Figure 6. A DHT for illustrating multi-attribute
binning
combinations of allowable generalizations for all attributes.
Let the number of quasi-identifying columns be CN, and
ni be the number of allowable generalizations for column
i, then the total number of allowable generalizations for the
table is
QCN
i=1 ni.
Among these allowable generalizations, some do not sat-
isfy k-anonymity, and are thereby invalid; the remaining are
valid for k-anonymity. Nevertheless, not all these valid gen-
eralizations are equally satisfactory. The point here is to
choose among them an ultimate generalization that results
in the minimal information loss. Nodes in this ultimate gen-
eralization are called ultimate generalization nodes. Clearly,
the calculation of information loss can be done by using
Equation (1), (2) and (3), although this may not be ideal
as it may incur unacceptable computation penalty. Instead,
we prefer simplifying this calculation by solely considering
“speciﬁcity loss” regarding the domain hierarchy trees. Let
the total number of leaf nodes of a tree be N and the num-
ber of generalization nodes of an allowable generalization
be Ng, we deﬁne speciﬁcity loss due to generalization to be
(N ¡ Ng)=N. This approach of estimating speciﬁcity loss
results in a more efﬁcient implementation, but it may reduce
accuracy.
Figure 7 outlines the above approach for determining the
ultimate generalization nodes. The function EnumGen(.)
enumerates all distinct combinations of allowable general-
izations among attributes, and the function Selection(.) de-
termines the generalization that incurs least speciﬁcity loss.
GenUltiNd(mingends[1..CN], maxgends[1..CN], tr[1..CN])
1. for i = 1..CN
2. allowblgens[i] Ã fgenj j genj is a generalization
constrained by mingends[i], maxgends[i] in tr[i]g
3. allgens Ã EnumGen(allowblgens[i], i = 1::CN)
4. validgens Ã fgenj j genj 2 allgens
V
genj satisﬁes
k-anonymityg
5. ultigen Ã Selection(validgens)
Figure 7. Multi-attribute binning algorithm
4.2.3 Binning Algorithm
A relevant observation to make is that the identifying
columns are most likely to be the key attributes (e.g., pri-mary key) of the table, containing the most important part
of information. Hence it is frequently useful to maintain the
identifying columns traceable to the data holder in health
care domain. For instance, as reported in [9], in some cases
patients may beneﬁt from being traced in research such as
the assessment of treatment safety. Moreover, many real-
world clinical projects such as those in [16] and in [10] sup-
port traceability of the medical data. Based on this obser-
vation, our binning algorithm adopts an one-to-one replace-
ment for data in the identifying columns. In particular, we
replace each data by its encrypted value that is generated
by an encryption function E() e.g., DES or AES. We point
out that keeping the identifying columns unsuppressed and
unmanipulated further is also important for watermarking.
Figure 8 outlines our complete binning algorithm, compris-
ing the encryption of the identifying columns and the bin-
ning of the quasi-identifying columns. Given the ultimate
generalization ultigen yielded by multi-attribute binning, the
function Bin(.) works by simply replacing each value in the
quasi-identifying columns by the value represented by its
corresponding node in ultigen.
Binning(tbl, ultigen)
1. foreach tuple ti 2 tbl
2. ti.ident.val Ã E(ti.ident.val)
3. ti.quasi-ident.val Ã Bin(ti.quasi-ident.val, ultigen)
Figure 8. Binning algorithm
5 Watermarking Algorithm
By its very nature, watermarking modiﬁes the data to be
watermarked, thereby further degrading data quality. Water-
marking works under a general assumption that the underly-
ing data can tolerate a certain degree of quality degradation.
The tolerance closely relates to the bandwidth for insertion,
implyingthatwatermarkingwouldfailunlessthedatacanbe
modiﬁed. The discovery of the available bandwidth appears
to be challenging in the case of watermarking relational data
[25, 23]. We next explain how to ﬁnd the desired bandwidth
channel for insertion in the binned data.
5.1 Bandwidth Channel
In our context, columns of a table after binning become
essentially categorical, and data modiﬁcation by watermark-
ing is equivalent to the permutation of data. We advocate
that a binned table can actually accommodate some degree
of data permutation, thereby providing the desired band-
width channel for watermarking.
From earlier discussions, we know that generalization of
a node in the hierarchy tree to its parent node renders in-
discrimination among this node and its sibling nodes. In
essence, a random permutation of values represented by
these nodes equals the effect of the generalization. As long
as such a generalization is allowed, watermarking relying
on the data permutation would deﬁnitely work. Recall that
the set of maximal generalization nodes deﬁned by usage
metrics are normally atop the set of ultimate generalization
nodes resulting from binning. Hence, generalizations be-
tween the two levels still respect usage metrics, which in
turn guarantee the viability of watermarking. It is important
to notice a special case where a ultimate generalization node
itself is also a maximal generalization node. Permutation of
suchnodesmightresultininformationlossabovethethresh-
old set by usage metrics. However, watermarking affects
only a small fraction of the data set, and hence such exces-
sive loss is expected to be minor. As a matter of fact, this is
thepricethatanywatermarkingmustpay. Moreimportantly,
we can readily tackle this scenario by slightly modifying the
way a maximal generalization node is deﬁned. Speciﬁcally,
in determining the set of maximal generalization nodes, the
bounds in Equation (4) are given slightly lower than actually
required for sustaining data usage, so that a small fraction of
the table is allowed to be generalized to the values repre-
sented by the maximal generalization nodes. Note however
that such transformation on a large scale would deﬁnitely
destroy the data.
5.2 Watermarking at A Single Level
A direct way to take advantage of the above bandwidth
channel is to consider permutation at the level of each ulti-
mate generalization node (together with its sibling nodes).
The exact primitive enabling bit insertion works as follows.
Suppose an ultimate generalization node p needs to be per-
mutated, and p and its sibling nodes compose a sorted set
S. To insert a bit b, our basic idea for determining a target
node q in S such that p ! q encodes the bit b is: the index
of q in S is even, if b = 0; the index of q in S is odd, if
b = 1. However, this does not sufﬁce since some elements
in S may not be ultimate generalization nodes, so if the tar-
get node q is not an ultimate generalization node, validity of
the generalization (see Section 4) is violated. To solve this
issue, we shall continue the permutation process downward
among the child nodes of q, and possibly even lower, until
an ultimate generalization node is reached. Our deﬁnition
of generalization guarantees the reachability. This idea of
achieving embedding by data permutation is similar to [23],
but we do within ﬁner domains (sub-domain of the column),
and more importantly we have solid justiﬁcations for per-
mutation. Unfortunately, watermarking at this single level is
susceptible to a kind of generalization attack that can com-
pletely destroy the inserted bits without knowing the water-
marking key.
Generalization attack
The generalization attack is speciﬁc to the binned data.
It works as follows: the attacker starts a further general-
ization on the watermarked table, generalizing each valueto the value represented by a higher generalization node in
the domain hierarchy tree. Because of the gap between the
maximal generalization nodes and the ultimate generaliza-
tion nodes, the table would sustain data usage. The general-
ization attack appears fatal as it does not require the secret
watermarking key at all. A careful analysis indicates that it
is the way we consider watermarking only at the level of ul-
timate generalization nodes that makes possible the attack.
To thwart this attack, we must additionally watermark all in-
termediate levels between the maximal generalization nodes
and the ultimate generalization nodes. This constitutes the
basic idea of our hierarchical watermarking scheme.
5.3 A Hierarchical Watermarking Scheme
In the hierarchical watermarking, we consider water-
marking at every level, from the maximal generalization
nodes to the ultimate generalization nodes. Speciﬁcally, for
an ultimate generalization node p to be permutated, water-
marking starts by ﬁrst determining the maximal generaliza-
tion node q that corresponds to p, followed by executing per-
mutations downward along the domain hierarchy tree from
the level of the child nodes of q, until the target node is an
ultimate generalization node. The exact primitive enabling
permutation at each level is the same as above. Consider
Figure 6 for example (for illustration’s sake, we need to in-
tentionally take the minimal generalization nodes therein as
the ultimate generalization nodes), where node 46 is going
to be permutated. First, the corresponding maximal gen-
eralization node 21 is determined. Next, permutation pro-
ceeds within nodes 32 and 33. If the target node is node 33,
then permutation stops; otherwise, the permutation contin-
ues within nodes 45 and 46, and eventually stops.
To avoid a large scale alteration, watermarking is ide-
ally restricted to a (small) portion of the whole data set.
We leverage on the (encrypted) identifying columns of the
binned table to select some tuples for embedding, recalling
that the encrypted identifying columns are assumed to keep
intact1. Based on a secret key k1 together with a secret tun-
able parameter ´, tuples ti in the table tbl satisfying the fol-
lowing equation are chosen for insertion:
H(ti:ident; k1) mod ´ = 0 8ti 2 tbl (5)
where H() is a cryptographic hash function e.g., MD5
or SHA1, and tbl.ident denotes the encrypted identifying
columns of tbl. Note that the way of secretely selecting tu-
ples directly pertains to the resilience of watermarking.
Typically, the available bandwidth is greater than the bit
length jwmj of the mark wm. This affords a multiple em-
bedding of wm for robustness reasons. That is, we repeat-
edly embed wm many times until the available bandwidth
1In case the identifying columns cannot be relied on, we can establish
virtual key attributes as in [20] by turning to other columns
is exhausted. In mark detection phase, the ﬁnal mark is de-
termined by majority voting over all the recovered copies.
A straightforward way to achieve multiple embedding is to
duplicate wm for l times into wmd, as long as we attempt
an l-embedding, and then to insert wmd in place of wm.
Take tbl.c, a quasi-identifying column of tbl for exam-
ple, our hierarchical watermarking algorithm by integrat-
ing the above ideas, is outlined in Figure 9. The function
MaxGNd(nd, tr, maxgends) returns the maximal general-
ization node that associates with nd.
Embedding(tbl, tr, maxgends, ultigends, k1, k2, ´, wm)
1. bits wmd Ã Duplicate(wm)
2. foreach tuple ti 2 tbl
3. if H(ti.ident, k1) mod ´ = 0
4. node targnd Ã Val2Nd(ti.c, ultigends)
5. targnd Ã MaxGNd(targnd, tr, maxgends)
6. do
7. targnd Ã Permutate(targnd, tr, ti, k1, k2, wmd)
8. while targnd = 2 ultigends
9. ti.c Ã Nd2Val(targnd)
Permutate(node nd, tr, tuple ti, k2, bits wmd)
1. sortedset S Ã fsi j si 2 Children(nd, tr)g
2. int indx Ã H(ti.ident, k2) mod jSj
3. indx Ã Set¹Bit(indx, wmd[H(ti.ident, k2) mod jwmdj])
4. return sindx
Detection(tbl, tr, maxgends, ultigends, k1, k2, ´, wm)
1. bits wmd Ã NULL /* set wmd to be empty */
2. foreach tuple ti 2 tbl
3. if H(ti.ident, k1) mod ´ = 0
4. node tmpnd Ã Val2Nd(ti.c, ultigends)
5. bit[] b = NULL, int i = 0 /* reset */
6. do
7. sortedset S Ãfsi j si 2 Siblings(tmpnd, tr)g
8. int indx Ã Index(tmpnd, S)
9. b[i] Ã indx&1
10. i Ã i + 1
11. tmpdnd Ã Parent(tmpnd, tr)
12. while tmpnd = 2 maxgends
13. wmd[H(ti.ident, k2) mod jwmdj] Ã MajorVot(b)
14. wm Ã MajorVot(wmd)
Figure 9. Hierarchical watermarking algorithm
In the algorithm, we exploit distinct keys k1 and k2 for
different calculations, which is vital in ensuring that there
is no mutual correlation between these calculations. Notice
that the hierarchical scheme enables to insert several copies
of a bit at every single embedding position, and the actual
numberisequaltothenumberoflevelsfromthecorrespond-
ing maximal generalization node to the ultimate generaliza-
tion node. Thus, when recovering a bit from a single em-bedding position, the bit is determined by majority voting.
Interestingly, in the voting process, we can assign a different
weight to each copy from a distinct level, depending on its
credit in determining the bit. This is of special use when en-
forcing the policy that the copy from a higher level is more
reliable than that from a lower level.
5.4 Resolving Rightful Ownership Problem
Robustness to attacks attempting to erase the embedded
mark is among the fundamental requirements of a sound wa-
termarking. However, this does not necessarily imply its
sufﬁciency in establishing ownership, because of the attack-
ing scenarios in Figure 10 (Dx, Wx and Kx are respectively
the original data, the mark and the secret watermarking key
of the entity x, Dw and Dw denote the watermarked data).

 
Figure 10. Rightful ownership attacks
Attack 1: the attacker inserts his bogus mark Wa into Dw,
which is the owner’s valid watermarked data, to create his
bogus Dw. Now that both Wo and Wa are contained in
Dw, the attacker and the owner can both claim the owner-
ship over Dw. This attack can be resolved by requiring the
attacker and the owner each to present his original data. As
the attacker’s “original” data Dw contains Wo of the owner,
false ownership claim by the attacker is clear.
Attack 2: In this case however, the attacker “extracts”
Wa from Dw to obtain his bogus original data Da, so that
Da©kaWa = Dw, where ©ka denotes the embedding func-
tion under key ka. This attack is more subtle to handle, since
itdoesnotalwaysholdthatDa containsWo andDo doesnot
contain Wa. So far, the only practical solution in multime-
dia watermarking is to restrict Wo to be F(Do), where F(:)
is an one-way function, so that given Dw, it is impossible to
acquire Da satisfying F(Da) = Wa by the attacker.
These attacks are in fact the rightful ownership problem
originally raised in [27] in multimedia context. It will be of
particular interest to see how the rightful ownership prob-
lem is handled in our case. We notice that virtually none of
the existing proposals for watermarking databases has pro-
vided a satisfactory solution to this problem, as either they
considered merely one case of it (e.g., [2, 20]) or they did
not address it at all (e.g., [25, 23]). Results from the mul-
timedia sector show that without invoking a third party for
certifying the watermarked data Dw, the rightful ownership
problem is solvable only when the original data are avail-
able in court. We believe this directly applies to the context
of databases. Considering the large number of data a table
contains, weactuallysuspectthepracticalityofpresentingto
the judge the entire original table as court proof in other pro-
posals. Surprisingly, the nature of the binned data enables us
to elegantly resolve this problem in our context. Recall that
the identifying columns of a binned table to be watermarked
are in encrypted format, which means the attacker has no
way to know the clear-text. So the mark in our scheme is
speciﬁed by applying the one-way function F(:) to a certain
statistical value v (e.g., mean) of these clear-text of the iden-
tifying columns. In resolving ownership dispute, the owner
presents v; decrypts the identifying columns and does the
same statistical computation over the decrypted data to get
v0; comparesthetwoasvalidifjv¡v0j < ¿, where¿ isapre-
deﬁned threshold; extracts the mark from the table in dispute
and compares it with F(v) as usual in a normal watermark-
ing scheme. Note that most probably, the watermarked table
in dispute had been attacked, e.g., some tuples were deleted
or some spurious tuples were added, and this explains why
we acquire the mark from a statistical value instead of the
actual clear-text.
The proposed solution is speciﬁc to our integration of
binning and watermarking, since a normal database does not
have such encrypted attributes. In nature, we do not violate
“original data as court proof”, whereas the integrated prop-
erty of our framework provides an effective means to get
over direct reliance on the entire original table.
6 Analysis
We next explore the seamlessness of our framework from
a theoretical perspective. In other words, we are concerned
with the effect watermarking has on the result of binning.
The main issue is related to the fact that watermarking in our
context involves permutation such that some tuples in a bin
may be permutated to other bins, and thus some bins may
have, after watermarking, a size less than k. This means
that watermarking may compromise the satisfaction to k-
anonymity of binning. Without loss of generality, we re-
strict our discussions to a particular quasi-identifying col-
umn c, which corresponds to a domain hierarchy tree hav-
ing m maximal generalization nodes Ni (i = 1::m), and ni
ultimate generalization nodes associated with each node Ni.
We further make the following assumptions: (i) bins that
correspond to the ultimate generalization nodes are of equal
size; (ii) when a bit-embedding proceeds downward from
Ni, all the ni ultimate generalization nodes associated with
Ni have equal probability of becoming the target node when
permutations halt. The actual effect of watermarking on bin-
ning can be reduced to the way any particular bin (BIN) that
corresponds to a ultimate generalization node UGN is af-fected by any bit-embedding (E).
Lemma 1. Let the maximal generalization node corre-
sponding to UGN be Nk, and the probability of E reducing
the bin size of BIN by 1 be Pr¡, then Pr¡ = nk¡1
nk
Pk
i=1 ni
.
Proof: Intuitively, for E to reduce the bin size of BIN
by 1, it must hold that as per our hierarchical watermark-
ing algorithm, 1) the bit chosen by E for insertion comes
from BIN; 2) afterwards, E executes downward permu-
tations (starting from Nk) among the nk ultimate general-
ization nodes that correspond to Nk, and the target node
of such permutations is not UGN. From assumption (i),
probability that the tuple chosen by E comes from BIN
is 1 Pm
i=1 ni, and from assumption (ii), probability of the
target node not being UGN is nk¡1
nk . Hence, altogether
Pr¡ = 1 Pm
i=1 ni £ nk¡1
nk = nk¡1
nk
Pk
i=1 ni
. }
Lemma 1 states the probability of any particular bit-
embedding E permutating a tuple out of a particular bin
BIN. We next check the probability of E permutating a
tuple from another bin to BIN.
Lemma 2. Let the maximal generalization node corre-
sponding to UGN be Nk, and the probability of E increasing
the bin size of BIN by 1 be Pr+, then Pr+ = nk¡1
nk
Pk
i=1 ni
.
Proof: For E to increase the bin size of BIN by 1, it must
hold that 1) E selects the tuple for insertion from any, but
UGN, of the nk ultimate generalization nodes that are asso-
ciated with Nk ; 2) the target node of the downward permu-
tations is UGN. From assumption (i), probability of the for-
mer is nk¡1 Pm
i=1 ni, and from assumption (ii), probability of the
latter is 1
nk. Hence, Pr+ = nk¡1 Pm
i=1 ni £ 1
nk = nk¡1
nk
Pk
i=1 ni
.}
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 suggest that on average, the wa-
termarking process would neither decrease nor increase the
bin size of any bin since Pr¡ = Pr+. We therefore con-
clude that watermarking does not interfere with binning in
the satisfaction of k-anonymity speciﬁcation under the two
ideal assumptions.
It is of importance to examine the assumptions from a
practical perspective. Making valid the ﬁrst assumption is
not that hard: we can incorporate “restrained swapping”
(e.g., swapping tuples among bins that correspond to sibling
nodes) into binning. In contrast, the second assumption is
more tricky, because its validity totally rests with the local-
ity of ultimate generalization nodes on the domain hierarchy
tree. Even so, we believe that by relaxing the two assump-
tions, watermarking still cannot seriously interfere with bin-
ning because: 1) only a small percentage of the whole data
gets watermarked; 2) and the use of hash function in the
“suitability” selection step (Equation (5)) renders a uniform
culling, which means no particular bin will be drastically
affected. To attest this, we have done experiments and ob-
tained consistent results (see next section). After all, we
have a simple yet practical method to tackle the interference
by applying k+² (² is a small number) to binning in meeting
k-anonymityspeciﬁcation. Aconservativemethodfordeter-
mining ² would be as follows: let s be the biggest bin size
and S be the sum of all bin sizes, then ² = (s=S) ¤ jwmdj.
7 Experimental Studies
We implemented and conducted extensive experiments
on the above algorithms. The real world data set we ex-
perimented on include one (randomized) identifying column
and ﬁve quasi-identifying columns, whose schema is R(ssn,
age, zip code, doctor, symptom, prescription). By a prepro-
cessing step, we created a DHT for each quasi-identifying
column: the DHT for symptom is based on the International
Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD-9), and other attributes are
on self-deﬁned ontology, e.g., that for age is similar to Fig-
ure 3 but of narrower intervals. The whole data set contains
around 20000 tuples. Experiments were done on a PC with
2G CPU and 512M RAM, and source codes were written
in Microsoft C++. A main simpliﬁcation we made is that a
set of maximal generalization nodes is directly given to each
column as usage metrics.
7.1 Robustness of Binning
First, our experiments focus on testing the binning algo-
rithm in satisfying k-anonymity. By providing to the algo-
rithm different values of k, we recorded the corresponding
loss of information. Figure 11 shows the relationship of k
versus information loss.
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Figure 11. k vs. information loss
From the ﬁgure, multi-attribute binning causes much
more information loss than mono-attribute binning, and
once k increases to a certain extent, information loss reaches
a saturation point and becomes rather stable. This is consis-
tent with the rationale in determining a valid minimal gen-
eralization node (Section 4.2), and this could be further op-
timized if the more aggressive strategy as introduced there
is employed. Further, we should also note that information
loss is closely related to the data size, the number of quasi-
identifying columns and k.data alteration (%)
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Figure 12. Robustness of hierarchical watermarking
7.2 Robustness of Watermarking
In this set of experiments, we test the robustness of the hi-
erarchical watermarking scheme to the attacks that endeavor
to destroy the embedded mark, while in the absence of the
secret watermarking key. The following experiments were
conducted by implementing a multiple embedding of a 20-
bit mark.
- Subset Alteration
In these attacks, the attacker chooses at random a subset of
the data and then modiﬁes them arbitrarily without affecting
the rest of the data. We vary the size of the randomly altered
data, and calculate the corresponding mark loss. Figure 12
(a) outlines the results. Clearly, the results show that our wa-
termarking scheme performs well against this attack. Even
in the case of more than 70% of data loss, our scheme loses
only approximately 30% of mark bits. Another fact shown
in the ﬁgure is that smaller ´ (more bandwidth) offers more
resilience, whereas more alteration to the data would be in-
curred. This is a trade-off that must be carefully considered
in practice.
- Subset Addition
In these attacks, new tuples are frequently added to the wa-
termarked set by the malicious attacker. Although this at-
tack does not involve erasing existing bits, it nevertheless
misleads the selection criteria (Equation (5)) to falsely take
some of the newly-added tuples as watermarked, thereby in-
troducing errors in majority voting the ﬁnal mark. Keep in
mind that if the size of the new data exceeds the original data
size, priority of the former would dominate the latter. Fig-
ure 12 (b) highlights the scheme’s robustness to the Subset
Addition attacks. The results reﬂect the fact that the newly-
added bogus bits do not take precedence over the existing
bits in the majority-voting process.
- Subset Deletion
The attacker randomly deletes a percentage of the tuples in
an attempt to remove the mark. To test the effect of dropping
tuples to the loss of mark bits, we continually delete some
tuples each time by the following SQL clause:
DELETE FROM R WHERE SSN > lvali AND SSN < uvali
where lvali and uvali deﬁne bounds of the ith deletion,
within which the tuples are to be deleted. Figure 12 (c) plots
the series of mark loss due to the deletions. From the ﬁg-
ure, it indicates that the hierarchical scheme is resilient to
the Subset Deletion attacks, and mark loss increases almost
linearly with the amount of data deleted.
We also tested the information loss due to watermarking,
and Figure 13 presents the results. Clearly, information loss
caused by watermarking is minor.
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Figure 13. Information loss of watermarking
7.3 Seamlessness of Framework
Finally, we shall examine how watermarking interferes
with binning, complementing the theoretic analysis in the
preceding section. The results are presented in Figure 14,
wherethedatain eachcolumnrespectivelyrepresentstheto-
tal number of bins, number of bins having bin size changed
and number of bins having bin size less than k. It can been
seen that a majority of the bins are affected by watermark-
ing, whereas the interference is minor in terms of satisfying
k-anonymity: none of the bins cannot meet k-anonymity
after watermarking. This is consistent with our analysis
that watermarking does not dramatically affect binning in
its compliance with k-anonymity speciﬁcation.
8 Conclusion
Two important issues inherent to the outsourcing of med-
ical data are the protection of individual privacy and copy-
right protection over the data. To meet these dual needs, 
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Figure 14. Effect of watermarking on binning
we have integrated techniques of binning and digital water-
marking into a uniﬁed framework, so as to provide compre-
hensive protection for outsourced data. Under our frame-
work, medical data are in turn binned to meet k-anonymity
speciﬁcation, and watermarked to provide copyright protec-
tion. We have discussed at length the development of the
binning algorithm and the watermarking algorithm that pro-
vide the two core functions in our framework, and devel-
oped an elegant solution to the rightful ownership problem
regarding watermarking, which may be difﬁcult to solve in
the context of other approaches. From both theoretical and
practical perspectives, we proved that watermarking would
not substantially interfere with binning in the satisfaction to
k-anonymity. Experimental results showed the robustness
of the proposed framework.
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